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After the conquest of Brucium, the Carthaginians should by all means (of which they had no shortage) try to take possession of Messana and make it impregnable in order to make it difficult for the Romans to cross into Sicily; however, they hesitated and limited themselves to half measures. Then they should at all costs prevent the crossing of the Roman army to this island; they had a means for this - a fleet - but, despite the experience that they experienced 20 years ago in the war with Pyrrhus, they neglected this too: the communication of the Romans with Sicily took place as freely as if it were connected to the mainland.

They did not bother to be interested in what was going on with their enemy both before the war and during the war while it lasted; therefore they knew nothing of such great and important events as the construction and equipping of new fleets in 260, 249 and 242; each time this came as a complete surprise to them and forced them to hasty and hasty countermeasures. In a tactical sense, the formulation of the information case was also completely unsatisfactory (except for Carthage in 249).

They failed to act decisively and consistently with their fleet, otherwise the damage inflicted on the Romans would have been much greater. True, they undermined Roman trade, ruined the coast in several places, but, for example, there was no question of blockade of Ostia; with the vast stretch of the coastline of Italy, they could cause incomparably greater harm to the Romans, which was especially convenient to do by occupying fortified points on the coast or on islands near the coast for a long time.

The biggest mistake was that the Carthaginians began to act energetically only when they were in immediate danger, and as soon as the enemy ceased to threaten them, they again lost all energy and were inactive. They did not use either the first three-year or the second seven-year break in the naval war to strengthen their fleet and more vigorously conduct the war; moreover, as soon as they ceased to fear an enemy attack from the sea, their own fleet immediately fell into complete decline; all these were unforgivable mistakes, for which the loss of the war should be considered a well-deserved and just retribution.

Vprochem, v takticheskom smysle i karfagenyane ne upuskali sluchaya deystvovat' nastupatel'no, chto ob"yasnyayetsya tem, chto u nikh, kak u starykh moryakov, nastupatel'naya taktika vsosalas' v plot' i krov'. Odnako v pervom zhe srazhenii u Mile oni proyavili tu zhe prestupnuyu bezzabotnost', vytekavshuyu iz prenebrezheniya k nepriyatelyu, kak i v oblasti strategii: s tridtsat'yu peredovymi korablyami, ne vystroiv ikh dazhe v boyevoy poryadok, karfagenskiy admiral dvinulsya pryamo protiv vchetvero sil'neyshego nepriyatelya, kotoryy pri pervoy zhe stychke zakhvatil vse eti korabli blagodarya abordazhnym mostkam i mnogochislennym legioneram. Sdelannaya vposledstvii popytka okruzhit' rimlyan i atakovat' ikh srazu so vsekh storon ne uvenchalas' uspekhom, tak kak rimlyane, izbegaya manevrirovaniya, vystroili svoi korabli po okruzhnosti. Gannibal schel togda srazheniye proigrannym i ostavil pole bitvy za rimlyanami; yesli by on etogo ne sdelal, Duiliy mog by okazat'sya v ochen' tyazhelom polozhenii, tak kak vo vremya dvizheniya vsem yego korablyam nevozmozhno bylo by derzhat'sya nosom v storonu nepriyatelya. Vprochem, storona, zakhvachennaya vrasplokh, chasto teryayet muzhestvo i prezhdevremenno priznayet sebya pobezhdennoy. Zamechatel'no, chto karfagenyane za vse vremya dolgoy voyny ne pridumali nikakogo sredstva protiv "voronov", chto sluzhit dokazatel'stvom polnogo otsutstviya tekhnicheskoy izobretatel'nosti i iskusstva; sami oni ne primenyali etogo prisposobleniya, po-vidimomu, potomu, chto na eto u nikh ne khvatalo muzhestva i doveriya k svoim soldatam. O neudovletvoritel'noy taktike pri Eknomose i o nepravil'noy taktike u Eguzy uzhe bylo skazano; zdes' my dobavim tol'ko neskol'ko slov po povodu taktiki, primenennoy karfagenyanami v 249 godu, kogda oni oderzhali yedinstvennuyu pobedu za vse vremya etoy dolgoy morskoy voyny. Adgerbal, kak i Kartolon, proyavili bol'shuyu ostorozhnost' i prisutstviye dukha, a pervyy, krome togo, i bol'shuyu energiyu; eto byli prekrasnyye morskiye vozhdi, kotoryye umeli derzhat' v rukakh boyevuyu silu i v takticheskom smysle deystvovali ochen' uspeshno. Odnako imena ikh uzhe ne upominayutsya v svyazi s dal'neyshimi sobytiyami: po vsey veroyatnosti, nagradoy im byla chernaya neblagodarnost', kak eto sluchalos' s pobedonosnymi vozhdyami i v Afinakh vo vremya gospodstva demagogov. Ksantipp, unichtozhivshiy armiyu Regula i spasshiy Karfagen, nesomnenno, po tem zhe prichinam dolzhen byl vernut'sya na rodinu.

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However, in the tactical sense, the Carthaginians did not miss the opportunity to act offensively, which is explained by the fact that they, like the old sailors, absorbed offensive tactics into their flesh and blood. However, in the very first battle at Miele, they showed the same criminal carelessness, resulting from disregard for the enemy, as in the field of strategy: with thirty advanced ships, without even lining them up in battle order, the Carthaginian admiral moved directly against four times the strongest enemy, who, with in the first skirmish he captured all these ships thanks to boarding bridges and numerous legionnaires. A subsequent attempt to surround the Romans and attack them from all sides at once was not successful, since the Romans, avoiding maneuvering, lined up their ships in a circle. Hannibal then considered the battle lost and left the battlefield for the Romans; if he had not done so, Duilius might have found himself in a very difficult position, since during the movement it would be impossible for all his ships to keep their bows towards the enemy. However, the side taken by surprise often loses courage and prematurely recognizes itself as defeated.

It is remarkable that the Carthaginians during the whole long war did not come up with any remedy against the "ravens", which serves as proof of the complete absence of technical ingenuity and art; they themselves did not use this device, apparently because they did not have the courage and confidence in their soldiers for this.

The unsatisfactory tactics under Eknomos and the wrong tactics under Aegusa have already been spoken of; here we will add only a few words about the tactics used by the Carthaginians in 249, when they won the only victory in this long naval war. Adgerbal, like Kartolon, showed great caution and presence of mind, and the first, in addition, showed great energy; they were excellent sea leaders who knew how to hold a fighting force in their hands and acted very successfully in a tactical sense. However, their names are no longer mentioned in connection with subsequent events: in all likelihood, black ingratitude was their reward, as happened with victorious leaders in Athens during the reign of demagogues. Xanthippus, who destroyed the army of Regulus and saved Carthage, undoubtedly, for the same reasons, had to return to his homeland.

It may seem incredible that such a state of affairs could develop in a large maritime state; however, modern times give a similar example, and, moreover, with a maritime power, which can in no way be reproached for a lack of militancy and which, on the contrary, is justly proud of a glorious military past. We are talking about England and her fleet. Having become after 1815 the mistress of all the seas, and proud of the successes achieved, she began to look with disdain at all other fleets and was not at all worried about the technical successes they had achieved and did not pay attention to those tactical and strategic changes that were created due to these successes; this led to the fact that at one time she stood behind other powers in all respects: France was ahead of her with paddle steamers, the United States was the first to use the screw, then France was the first to build a steam-powered linear screw ship (in the Crimean War). Fortunately for England, these facts gave her a strong impetus, but her inertia was so great that she followed the example of others only with extreme slowness (the first armored frigate, ram, artillery, cruisers appeared in France). Only two decades after all these "scarecrows" (scares) came into use, England set about improving and increasing its fleet.

She showed even greater backwardness in strategic and tactical respects; the first time large maneuvers were made in 1850, until then there was complete inactivity and complete uncertainty regarding the use of the fleet both in the war as a whole and in individual battles. Hence the conclusion about the need for constant hard work.

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It is necessary to say a few words about the second Punic War, since Mahan touches on it in the preface to his major work, The Influence of Sea Power on History. He says: "The victorious side could establish its dominance at sea." This cannot be stated so unconditionally - it is necessary at the same time to pay attention to the internal situation of Carthage and its inability to use its naval forces. The First Punic War and its consequences weakened Carthage: he suffered huge losses in people and money, and also paid 3,200 talents of indemnity; True, the rich trade and vast territory of Carthage provided sufficient income and the opportunity to supply his fleet with people indefinitely, but he did nothing of this and almost did not use his fleet.

The Second Punic War was not the war of Carthage, but the war of Hannibal and his brother, the sons of Hamilcar Barca. Hamilcar managed to stop the arose in 240-237. an extremely dangerous war against hired soldiers and save Carthage; nevertheless, his countrymen hated him because they feared him; he was the head of an anti-Roman military party and decided to create an army equal to the Roman one, with the aim of retaking Sicily. He recovered with his son-in-law Hasdrubal to Spain, where until then only trading posts had existed, conquered most of it, founded his own, almost independent state, which he gave an excellent organization, at the same time he created an excellent army. This army did not consist of mercenaries, but was recruited from local residents, who, through long service and strict education, were accustomed to military affairs and were completely devoted to their leader. But he didn't have a fleet.

When Hannibal in 219 BC. e., after the death of Hamilcar, was elected leader, he already had an army of over 100,000 people, but the Carthaginian fleet was in a miserable state and part did not even have rigging. Hannibal, a talented military leader, unlike his compatriots, was not a sailor and, apparently, like the Romans, even felt an aversion to the sea.

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воскресенье, 13 октября 2019 г.

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воскресенье, 13 октября 2019 г.