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The Carthaginians, on the contrary, had a free sea behind them, could move freely and, as needed, could concentrate their forces; they could enter the gaps between enemy ships and attack one ship with two or three ships simultaneously from different sides. Thus, they had the opportunity to use their mobility; in addition, at the head of them, in the person of Adherbal, was a skillful admiral who knew how to inspire them. As a result, the battle soon took a turn unfavorable for the Romans: several ships that moved forward to attack were sunk, others ran aground or stumbled upon rocky islets; the right flank suffered the most, against which the Carthaginians threw their main forces.

Consul Claudius, seeing that the battle was lost, rushed to flee on his ship (he was on the left flank) along the coast to Lilybeum; about 30 ships managed to escape with him, all the rest were destroyed or captured - only 93 ships and 40,000 crew members, and according to other sources, even 137 ships, the crew of which was supposed to reach 50,000 people. This was the only naval victory of the Carthaginians in this long and predominantly naval war, lasting 24 years; but on the other hand, this victory was also the most decisive, since the Carthaginians themselves did not lose more than three-quarters of their ships in a single battle.

The conclusions that can be drawn from this battle are obvious:

1) it was wrong to go into battle with most of the recruits in the crews;

2) it was also wrong to assume that ships with such crews would be able to accurately calculate their movement at night in order to attack at dawn; with people who had recently entered the service, it was necessary to be careful in calculations;

3) it was a mistake to line up for such an attack a large fleet in a wake column, which was bound to be upset at night; the head part had to start the attack alone, and it could easily be defeated before the rear guard arrived in time.

The Carthaginians, with their usual criminal carelessness, did not think at all about what was happening with the enemy; they even withdrew the squadron that usually stood at Drepanum, in which at that moment there was no urgent need, and therefore, when Catulus approached Drepanum, he did not find any enemy there and could immediately blockade both this harbor and Lilybeum; at the same time, the supply of supplies to Hamilcar, who was in Eryx, was also cut off. Catulus immediately ordered to build fortifications around Drepanum, which at the same time protected him from Eryx, and began the siege of the city. At the same time, he tirelessly exercised his fleet, which soon improved greatly and, in anticipation of the attack of the Carthaginians, attended to the organization of intelligence.

The Carthaginians were all the more amazed at the news of the appearance of a new Roman fleet, because they considered themselves completely safe; they hastily gathered all the ships they could to provide supplies for Hamilcar, Drepanum, and Lilybeum, who very soon began to feel short of everything. By the beginning of 241, they had collected about 250 ships, of which, however, some were merchant ships; but there were not enough officers, soldiers and slaves to work on the oars, since no one had taken care of anything in advance. Meanwhile, the imminent danger threatened - there was nothing left but to put completely untrained people on the ships. Then all the ships, including the military, were loaded, as much as possible, with all sorts of supplies. With this fleet, which could rather be called an armed convoy, at the beginning of March 241, Hanno set out to sea from Carthage, who was entrusted with command of it.

Similar cases have been repeated in our day: the transport fleet went out into the sea, on which dominance was not won, and moved directly on the enemy without reconnaissance, without any cunning and trick - just straight ahead. This happened during the Japanese-Chinese, and the Spanish-American, and the Russian-Japanese war. The Japanese transport fleets with troops made their campaigns much earlier than the Japanese defeated and blocked the Chinese fleet. The Americans also sent an army to S. Iago, not providing themselves enough from a possible attack by the Spanish fleet. As for Rozhdestvensky's campaign, then, of course, Rozhdestvensky's fleet cannot be called a transport fleet. In the literature, however, the failure of Rozhdestvensky was often associated with his concern for transports (the base with him).

The poor management of the fleet deserves special attention. At first glance, it is obvious that the commander of the fleet, who took his place with his ship at the very end of the marching wake column, whose head was supposed to start the attack, made a gross mistake. He lost the opportunity to follow the general course of affairs, could not give any order in unforeseen cases, his flagship was no longer leading the entire fleet, but, on the contrary, he himself had to follow the movements of the other ships; in a word, he completely lost control of the fleet. In this case, the commander of the vanguard was apparently ordered to bring the head of the column into the harbor of Drepanum and attack the Carthaginian ships, which were supposed to be taken by surprise and without a crew. Due to a significant delay, the Carthaginian fleet managed to leave the harbor even before the head of the attacking column entered it; thus, the object of the attack was no longer in the intended place, but the one in command of the head of the column did not have the quick wit or determination, or, perhaps, both together, to make the appropriate changes himself, that is, to begin to pursue the departing enemy; he continued mechanically to carry out the order originally received, despite the fact that the order no longer corresponded to the state of affairs; he had no opportunity to receive new instructions, since the commander of the fleet was far behind; indeed, he never received these instructions in a timely manner. Hence the confusion in the narrow passage to the harbor, accidents and confusion on the right flank.

The loss of this battle was to be attributed mainly to the poor leadership of the fleet, which was expressed, first of all, in the fact that the commander of the fleet took a completely inappropriate place for him, and then in the absence of a proper agreement between him and the commander of the forward part of the squadron. The question of the place that is most suitable for the admiral is extremely important, and we will return, perhaps to it later, but here we will confine ourselves to a general remark: the most suitable place for the admiral is the one from which he can best and most likely direct the actions of the fleet .

The successes of the Carthaginians at sea were not limited to the victory at Drepanum; after this victory, Adgerbal sent one of the squadron commanders, Kartolon, with 100 ships to Lilybeum to destroy the remnants of the blockade fleet. In order to accomplish this task properly, and not as Claudius did, Cartholon approached Lilybaeum at dawn, captured several Roman ships, set others (probably aground) on fire, and thus opened the besieged city to the sea; thereupon, hearing of the approach of a new Roman fleet, he departed, following along the south coast.

While Claudius had gone to Lilybaeum, the second consul of 249, Lucius Junius, with a large transport fleet to supply supplies to the army besieging that city, arrived under heavy cover at Messana; here other ships joined him, so that the entire fleet consisted of 120 warships and almost 800 transport ships. From Messana they went to Syracuse, where they had to take more supplies of grain. In view of the haste of the matter, quaestors were sent forward to Lilybeum with half the transport fleet and a squadron of penthers. Kartolon ambushed them and overtook them not far from Enomos, but the quaestors were already warned by reconnaissance ships sent ahead, and, considering themselves too weak to accept the battle, managed to take refuge in the bay of a small town friendly to the Romans - Fintias. They immediately got the throwing machines available in the city, installed them on the rocky ledges that surrounded the bay, and thus arranged a coastal battery to protect the fleet.

Kartolon attacked this battery, but met with serious resistance, and convinced of the strength of the defensive works, he contented himself with capturing several ships, and then anchored for observation, not far east of the city. He organized observation of everything that was happening with the help of reconnaissance ships, from which he soon learned of the approach from Cape Pachinus of Consul Junius with the second half of the fleet. In order not to be forced to fight at once with both parts of the fleet, which together outnumbered him (120 ships against 100), he immediately weighed anchor and went to meet Junius, who knew nothing about the position of the quaestors at Fintias. He met him at Kamarin and, since Junius also did not want to fight, forced him to anchor at the rocky shore. The Romans always avoided the open sea, the Carthaginians, as sailors, on the contrary, strove for it. To attack the Romans at this place, Cartholon found it inconvenient and anchored in the middle between both Roman fleets, so that he could observe them and receive information from his reconnaissance ships about both. Meanwhile, there were signs of bad weather approaching, and the wind blew from the southwest. Experienced in maritime affairs, the Carthaginians remained in place until the danger threatened, and then promptly weighed anchor and went to the open sea; using a favorable wind, they rounded Cape Pachinus and stood in safety on the eastern coast. Both Roman fleets, unprotected from the storm, were washed ashore and perished; not a single ship escaped, moreover, more than 900 ships sank, on which there were probably up to 60,000 crew members.

Hanno was well aware of his weakness and therefore proposed first to go to Drepanum, unload supplies from warships there, take on board Hamilcar, whom the Romans were very afraid of, with his brave and skillful soldiers, and then attack the besieged fleet at Lilybeum. Previously, he went to Giera (Maritima) to wait for a favorable wind.

However, Hanno was mistaken in his opinion about Catulus. The latter learned in time about Hanno's performance and gathered his entire fleet off the island of Egusa, placing the best soldiers on it. While the Carthaginians appeared, a fresh western breeze blew favorable to them, which caused such a violent excitement that Catulus had doubts about the possibility of fighting under such conditions; however, based on the information received about the poor condition of the enemy fleet, he still decided to fight; moreover, having gone to sea, he was convinced that, thanks to enhanced exercises, the commanders of the ships could perfectly hold them in their hands and act in battle. He lined up the fleet between Egusa (Favignano) and Forbantia (Branzo) and moved towards the Carthaginians approaching under sail with a fresh breeze, blocking their path.

Chance favored Hanno this time, and gave him yet another chance of success; he was able to:

a) to take advantage of the fresh breeze and break through the Roman fleet, moving with difficulty on oars on a turbulent sea, as did Hannibal, who broke through the fleet blockading Lilybeum with a favorable wind;

b) send forward your transport ships, and yourself slowly follow them in combat readiness and prevent the Romans from pursuing them;

c) finally, try to get around the Roman system in an arc and, taking advantage of the sailing, try to get away from the enemy.

Adherbal would probably have chosen one of these solutions, but Gannon did not have his talent. He knew that his ships were far inferior in combat capability to the Roman ones, he barely managed to line up his fleet in order before he approached the Romans, nevertheless he ordered to remove the sails and with his inexperienced rowers - slaves and soldiers, took the fight at the oars.

There could be no doubt about the outcome of the battle; the matter was decided at the first collision; as a result, 50 Carthaginian ships were sunk, 70 were captured along with their crews; the remaining 130 were saved due to the fact that just before the collision they set sail and went aside; as the wind blew to the north, they headed back to Giera.

Catulus renewed the blockade of Lilybeum and Drepanum. There was no longer any hope for help, and the garrisons of both cities, as well as the army of Hamilcar, had to surrender from hunger. Then the Carthaginians gave Hamilcar unlimited powers to negotiate a peace, which was soon concluded between two skillful and noble leaders - Hamilcar and Catulus. However, in Rome, peace conditions were given an even more severe character. Carthage committed to:

1) clear Sicily and not wage war with Hieron;

2) to cede Corsica, Sardinia, Malta and all other islands located between Sicily and Africa;

3) to pay within ten years 3200 talents of indemnity.

Thus ended, with the victory of the ground forces over the sea, the 24-year war, as it was in the Peloponnesian War. Carthage in 264 also dominated the western part of the Mediterranean Sea, as Athens in 431 over its eastern part; he maintained a numerous military fleet, which had no equal, possessed many colonies, which he ruled autocratically and severely, monopolized in his hands all maritime trade, which brought him undoubted wealth; the sea served him as a defense, as Athens was protected by their impregnable walls, and he could only be defeated by the sea. The similarity of both wars, which continued with varying success for almost the same period of time, lies in the fact that both wars ended in a decisive defeat of the power that dominated the sea, moreover, this defeat was achieved quite easily in a battle that was not of particular tactical interest.

To decide whether the defeat of a maritime power in the struggle against a land power is inevitable, it is necessary to consider in more detail the conditions in which both sides found themselves, as well as the actions of both sides in strategic and tactical respects.

The Romans were a tightly knit, stern, brave and warlike people, steadily pursuing a policy of conquest; in continuous wars that lasted for centuries, they conquered all of Italy, defeated Pyrrhus, moreover, they did not have to resort to far-sighted strategic plans; hostile armies simply marched on each other and then fought; the whole question was one of tactics, and in this respect the Romans acquired a great deal of experience, which, however, concerned exclusively land tactics. With the sea, as a theater of war, they were hardly familiar and did not feel attracted to it.

In view of this, having managed, through the carelessness of the Carthaginians, to cross over to Sicily, they tried to achieve decisive results by war on land, and only after they failed to achieve this for four years, they decided to start a naval war and immediately, with amazing energy, led this decision is to be implemented.

Rightly estimating the one point in which they were superior to their opponent, they devised and energetically set in motion a method in which this superiority could be put to the best use; this gave them a brilliant victory in the first battle; but instead of, as was their custom, immediately after this victory, stepping directly on the throat of the enemy, they used the method common in naval warfare, and wanted to force the enemy to surrender by attacking his remote possessions.

This strategy did not give a positive result for another four years, and only then did they decide to deliver a direct blow to the enemy with all their forces, despite the fact that for this it was necessary, not owning the sea, to put the army on ships and transport it to enemy territory, which itself was in itself an unacceptable risk; they succeeded in all this so much that certain success was already visible ahead, when suddenly, for completely inexplicable reasons and without apparent reason, they withdrew back most of their army and fleet, after which the rest of the first was destroyed by the enemy.

Instead of correcting the mistake and doubling their efforts to achieve victory, they, having won a new major victory near the enemy's shores, left their last stronghold on these shores, which could serve as a convenient place for the landing of the army. Having then suffered heavy losses not from the enemy, but from their own unfamiliarity with naval affairs and from the stubbornness of their leaders, they finally abandoned the naval war and limited themselves to the land war in Sicily; thus, they again returned to the mode of action that six years ago they themselves recognized as ineffective, and again got the same negative result.

Then they began to build a fleet again; things went better, Lilybeum was besieged, but then the change of command ruined everything. The stupid actions of the new consul Claudius Pulchra against the Carthaginian fleet at Drepanum and the ineptitude of another consul at Camarin

After these terrible losses, the senate again decided to stop the naval war, but during this time the Roman armorers began to engage in privateering, as a profitable business; the government encouraged and supported them by supplying them with ships. Then they began to undertake large-scale predatory campaigns with strong squadrons, and were not limited to capturing prizes and undermining Carthaginian trade, but even made landings on enemy shores. They devastated part of the African coast, imposed indemnities or burned many cities, among them the significant seaside city of Hippo; thus, the enemy suffered great damage. The fact that not only individual Roman privateers, but even entire squadrons could violate the safety of navigation after the Roman government stopped the war, serves as new evidence of the inability of the Carthaginian government to conduct naval warfare and in general to military affairs. In the battle of Drepanum, the Carthaginians did not suffer any significant losses, and on the south coast, when the huge Roman fleet was destroyed by a storm, they did not lose a single ship; thus they had a strong navy at their disposal, as well as the necessary means to increase it as needed; they had no shortage of skillful commanders: Adgerbal showed himself under Drepanum as a decisive, and at the same time cautious and energetic admiral who knew how to control his fleet and his subordinates; Kartolon also sensibly and efficiently carried out the instructions given to him.

With such means, and taking advantage of the superior speed of their ships, the Carthaginians could establish such control of the sea that even a single privateer would hardly dare to go to sea, not to mention a whole squadron that plundered the distant African coast. Meanwhile, the Carthaginians neglected their fleet, while cutting off all sea communications and ruining the coast, they could have done the Romans such harm that within a year they would have forced them into peace. This was all the more possible because for seven whole years (248-241 BC) no Roman fleet appeared at sea. The conduct of the war in Sicily and its environs was taken over by Hamilcar Barca (lightning). He began to wage war in a new way, regardless of Carthage, since he himself began to extract the necessary means for this with the help of the fleet. He raised his own army and instilled his spirit into it. First, he went to southern Italy, ruined and overlaid with indemnity the banks of Locrium and Brucium; then, he went to Panormus and occupied the height of Geirkte (Monte Pellgrino), located at the western end of the bay and descending into it by a steep cliff; this hill was a plateau two nautical miles long and from 345 to 400 meters high, in the middle of which there was a peak 620 meters high, representing an excellent observation point; on this hill Hamilcar, relying on his fleet, held out for almost three years. From here he constantly threatened from the sea and from land to Panormus, which was only two kilometers away; the Romans had to be constantly on the alert, and they were forced to put their detachment at the foot of the mountain. Almost daily skirmishes took place with this detachment among the Carthaginians, and all sorts of tricks were used; however, Hamilcar did not bring things to a decisive battle, and the Romans could not drive him off the mountain.

The squadron of Hamilcar made raids on the coasts of southern Italy as far as Naples and even north of it, delivered supplies for the army and supported communication. Meanwhile, the siege of Lilybeum from land continued, but since communication with the sea was free, the city continued to hold out. Apparently, in order to be closer to him, Hamilcar cleared the height of Geirkte, went to Drepanum and unexpectedly captured the city of Eryx, which stood on a mountain of the same name, on a high steep terrace. The top of the mountain, which had about 790 meters in height as well as its sole, was occupied by the Romans and, thus, Hamilcar was almost completely surrounded by them, having only a difficult roundabout road to communicate with the sea and the fleet. Nevertheless, he managed to stay here for two years, waging continuous battles and causing great harm to the Romans. His squadron during this time, apparently, lost its combat value; in any case, she no longer played any role in the approaching denouement. Thus the war dragged on until 242, with Rome suffering heavy losses; it was impossible to take Lilybeum from land, and the Romans could not do anything against Hamilcar and his well-organized army either. This state of affairs continued for seven years without any change, and only the war of marque at sea went on as usual. Despite this, the senate did not want to resume major operations at sea, although it was quite obvious that the only way out could be achieved there; besides, the treasury was empty. Then the armorers who were engaged in privateering and other rich Romans offered to put at the disposal of the state a fleet that could put an end to the war, which undermined trade and caused incalculable losses to the state; at the same time, they set the only condition that, in case of victory, their expenses would be reimbursed. It is impossible not to be surprised at such a large sacrifice, which, although it was made in one's own interests, nevertheless serves as proof of high patriotism. With their usual energy, the Romans set about implementing a new plan, and, based on 18 years of experience, conducted the matter more skillfully and with more knowledge of the matter than in the past. The ship of Hannibal of Rhodes was taken as a model; according to this model, 200 fast penteres were built, with which, at the beginning of the summer of 242, the consul Gaius Lutatius Catulus went to Sicily.

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Computer science is a fundamental natural science that studies the structure and general properties of information, as well as issues related to the processes of collecting, storing, searching, transmitting, processing, converting and using information in various fields of human activity using computer and organizational techniques.

Information (from the Latin. Informatio - explanation, exposition) was originally understood as information transmitted by people orally, in writing or in another way using conditional signals, technical means, etc. Since the middle of the 20th century, information has been a general scientific concept, including: the exchange of information between people, a person and an automaton, an automaton and an automaton; exchange of signals in the animal and plant world; transmission of signs from cell to cell, from organism to organism, etc.

Information can also be defined as a set of information that reduces the degree of uncertainty of knowledge about specific events, processes, phenomena, etc.

Depending on the scope of use, the information may be economic, technical, genetic, etc.

Under the economic information refers to information characterizing industrial relations in society.

It includes information of an economic nature about production processes, material resources, production management processes, financial processes that circulate in the economic system.

Economic informatics is a science that studies the methods of automated processing of economic information using computer and organizational technology.

The subject of economic informatics are: technology and stages of development of systems for automated processing of economic information and justification of the appropriateness of such processing, a functional analysis of the subject area, an algorithmic representation of the problem and its software implementation.

From a modern point of view, computer science can be considered both as a science, and as an applied discipline, and as a branch of the national economy.

Computer science as a science
Computer science as a fundamental scientific discipline considers the following concepts:

information and information resources;

technical means of information processing;

Information Technology;

Information Systems.

These concepts are discussed in detail below in p. "Basic concepts of economic informatics."

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вторник, 22 октября 2019 г.

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